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THE SOCIALIZATION. OF JUVENILE COURT
PROCEDURE"
MIRIAM VAN WATERS'
The usefulness of any human institution depends on the degree to
which it is socialized. The juvenile court movement represents to a
remarkable extent the way in which such an ancient legal institution
as court procedure may be animated by the spirit of humanism. Courts,
for thousands of years, have been rendering decisions, but until the
juvenile court with its clinics, its staff of experts, doctors, psychologists,
psychiatrists and social workers'was established no one ever traced the
actual result of a court decision in terms of humain values. What be-
comes of the lives of individuals upon whom the courts pass judgment?
What sum total of end-results have we accumulated? No one knows.
But the juvenile court is conceived in the spirit of the clinic; it is a
kind of laboratory of human behavior.
How this result is achieved by a procedure that is socialized this
paper will try to explain. For illustration of the statutory law on
which the juvenile court is based, California will be chosen as an
example.
The Juvenile Court of California, first established by legislative
enactment in 1903, now operates under statutes amended in 1915 sub-
stantially as follows: A judge of the Superior Court is chosen by his
fellow judges to sit as a Juvenile Court judge. Jurisdiction extends to
persons under twenty-one years of age. (Under certain conditions
persons charged with felony between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
one are dealt with by the criminal courts.) The law formulates no
definition of delinquency or dependency, but enumerates fourteen spe-
cific conditions under which a child may be brought before the court.
These conditions embrace the range of offenses, behavior-difficulties,
physical, mental and social handicaps which cause or tend to cause a
child to need the protection and guardianship of the state. The Ju-
venile Court has jurisdiction over adults criminally liable for con-
tributing to certain of the above conditions.
Proceedings are begun by petition filed with the clerk of the
Superior Court by any interested person who, on information and
belief, alleges that a child comes within the provisions of the law. The
attendance of the child and its parents is secured by citation; a war-
rant may be issued if citation seems likely to be ineffectual. Attend-
ance of witnesses is secured by subpcena.
'Referee of Juvenile Court, Los Angeles County, Calif.
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The law states, 2 No. 5: "In no case shall an order adjudging a
person to be a ward of the Juvenile Court be deemed to be a convic-
tion of crime." Any order made by the court may be changed, modi-
fied, or set aside, as to the judge may seem meet and proper. Provision
for an appeal from judgment is made. The keynote to the Act is
found in No. 24, entitled "Construction": "This Act shall be liberally
construed, to the end that its purpose may be carried out, to-wit, that
the care, custody and discipline of a ward of the Juvenile Court, as
defined in this act, shall approximate as nearly as may be that which
should be given. by his parents.3
California, in counties of the first class, that is to say, Los An-
geles, joins New Mexico as the only state that specifically provides by
law for the appointment of a woman referee to hear cases of girls
and young boys brought before the court. The referee has the usual
power of referees in chancery cases, hears the testimony of witnesses
and certifies to the judge of the Juvenile Court findings upon the case,
together with recommendation as to the judgment or order to be made.
Such, in brief, is the legal background of the Juvenile Court in
Los Angeles County. Since the enactment of 1915 all cases of girls
under twenty-one, and boys under thirteen, have been privately heard
in the detention home by a woman referee. Socialization of procedure
has been the rule, and if the number of cases appealed is a test, the
plan has been successful, for during the four years when Orfa Jean
Shontz, the first woman referee to be appointed, heard these cases,
over six thousand matters were before the court, and not one appeal
was taken from her findings and recommendations.
The qualifications of the woman who is to serve as referee of the
Juvenile Court have not been defined by law. In chancery practice it
is presumed that the master, or referee, is chosen because of some
special skill; thus cases where estates are involved are sometimes re-
ferred to accountants; referees in bankruptcy proceedings are very gen-
eral. Anciently the Anglo-Saxon usage was to appoint learned men,
bishops, physicians or lawyers, and that the custom was displeasing to
some is indicated as early 1377, when a petition was addressed by the
House of Commons to the King pleading that "masterships and other
singularities" be done away with, but we find King Henry V address-
ing one of his masters in chancery thus, "that ye make suche an ende
in this matiere that we be no more vexed hereafter with thaire com-
plaints and God have you in His keeping."'4
2California Statutes, approved June 5, 1915; amended 1917, p. 1002.
3Loc. Cit., Section 5.
4Henderson, John G., Chancery Practice, p. 121; Chicago, 1904.
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The referee is the "arm of the court." In the training of a woman
referee of the Juvenile Court sound legal knowledge is essential, par-
ticularly of the law of evidence and principles of the laws relating to
the protection of minors and women and all that pertains to domestic
relations. Knowledge of psychology, mental hygiene, sociology and
anthropology, at least those branches of anthropology that deal with
criminology, and racial traits and capacities is much to be desired.
The referee should have had training in social work, in the elements
of the case-method and in the practical field of probation. She should
have imagination and a sense of humor and a genuine love of youth.
Socialization-what do we mean by this term as applied to Ju-
venile Court procedure? I take it to mean the process by which the
purpose and goal of the Juvenile Court is best attained, that method
which best frees the spirit of the Juvenile Court and permits it to
serve the social ideal it was created to express.
Briefly, then, we must call to mind its origin. The Juvenile Court
sprang into being in the decade following .the Illinois legislation of
1898 in response to the demand of a civic conscience freshly awake to
the horror of treating children as criminals. In theory this court is
parental, a court of guardianship, not a criminal or quasi-criminal
court, but a court where the paramount issue is the welfare of the
child. Rooted in the ancient Anglo-Saxon concept of the King as the,
"ultimate guardian of his subjects, who by reason of helplessness
could not help themselves," the Juvenile Court is the modern out-
growth of the power of parens patriae, administered through the Eng-
lish courts of chancery, as students of the Juvenile Court movement,
notably Judge Edward Waite of Minnesota, have so ably pointed out.5
That simple folk looked to the courts of equity for remedy against
the rigors of the common law is expressed as early as 1321. Aubyn de
Clyton, complaining of a gross and outrageous trespass, petitions the
court of equity on the ground that "the said Johan and Phillip hold
their heads so high and are so threatening that the said Aubyn does
not dare contest with them at the common law." Desire for socializa-
tion in this ancient chronicle here mingles with a touching confidence
in its attainability.
While the legal basis of the Juvenile Court is rooted in equity,
two fundamental, modern ideas concerning the child, one biological,
the other social, have united in the formation of the Juvenile Court.
5Waite, Edward F., The Origin and Development of the Minnesota Juvenile
Court. Pub. by the State Board of Control, St. Paul, Minn., 1920, 20 p.
OHenderson, John G., Chancery Practice, p. 121; pub. Chicago, 1904.
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Biology teaches us that the child is a being quite different from
the adult. His way of feeling and his response are governed by nat-
ural laws that pertain to youth; his behavior is an adjustment to life,
ruled by cause and effect. The whole being of the child is sacred to
growth. And throughout the period of growth, during the whole
course of his immaturity, he is held to be plastic, capable of infinite
modification. Unless this modern concept of the child is mastered we
cannot understand the principle of the Juvenile Court.
The second fundamental idea is that of the child as an asset to
the state. The child is an asset, greater than all his faults. It is the
duty of the state in the interests of its own self-preservation to take
care of the child when parents have failed him. The Juvenile Court
law formulated by the legislature of Illinois in 1898 was an expression
of these principles, and the machinery created to express and to enforce
these principles harked back to the ancient usage of Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence. It is well to stress this point for the benefit of certain
critics who think, ,or appear to think, the Juvenile Court a kind of
modern, benevolent mushroom, foisted on the body of the law by social
uplifters.
In our discussion of rights in the Juvenile Court the main right to
be considered is the right of the child, his primary right to shelter,
protection and proper guardianship. The first requirement in socializa-
tion is a method for getting the whole truth "about the child.
Analogy here brings the court close to the spirit of the clinic. The
physician searches for every detail that bears on the condition of the
patient. The physician demands all the facts because he believes it is
only good that can follow to his patient. The patient is privileged to
expect a good, but only on condition that he reveal all the facts and
submit himself utterly. He is freed from fear because the aim of the
examination is his own welfare.
Quite contrary is the spirit of legal action. The defendant is
hemmed about with elaborate safeguards against improper questions.
The right of a witness not to incriminate himself, his right to the
secrecy of certain inviolate privileged relations and communications,
all the rules of evidence that exclude certain kinds of truth from the
ear of the court as irrelevant, incompetent and immnaterial have grown
up with a view to protect the individual from the power of the state
to inflict penalty upon him. Fear of injustice, dread of punishrent,
these are the human emotions expressed vividly in the! dry phrasing of
the rules of evidence, just as in the folk saying:
"Only the rich can afford justice; only the poor cannot escape it."
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The Juvenile Court, on the other hand, can demand the whole
truth because it has the power to save, to protect, and to remedy. Its
orders, or judgments, are not penal, but parental. Its object in deter-
mining truth' is not incrimination but the gaining of that understanding
which must precede constructive discipline or treatment. In a trial at
law the early history of the defendant is immaterial from a legal point
of view. The fact that in childhood he suffered from night terrors,
that at nine years of age he had convulsions, that an early sex experi-
ence has distorted his view of reality, that his sisters are prostitutes
and his father an alcoholic epileptic may not have the slightest rele-
vancy in court procedure. His wife may be incompetent to testify that
he confided to her the secret strains and repressions that have warped
his behavior. In short, the truthful picture of the man as an indi-
vidual may be ruled out of consideration. In a socialized Juvenile
procedure no useful evidence should be excluded from the court. Each
relevant fact should be admissible, but we should adhere closely to
that body of the rules .of evidence which applies the test to truth.
Hearsay, incompetent evidence, opinion, gossip, bias, prejudice, trends
of hostile neighborhood feeling-all these sources of error should be
ruled out of the Juvenile Court as rigidly as from any other court. If
socialization of court procedure means letting down the bars so that
social workers can dispense with good case-work, or can substitute
their fears and prejudices for the presentation of real evidence, heaven
forbid any increase in socialization! No, the test of truth in the Ju-
venile Court should be definite, scientific, carefully scrutinized.
The second principal in socialization is co-operatioi. In order to
secure the welfare of a human being it is necessary that he assent.
Compulsory uplift, like compulsory education, is difficult, if not, so-
cially, impossible. To the clinic the patient comes because he feels
sick; in the court the young person comes because he must. It is the
business of the social worker . . . to make him feel sick before-
hand; that is to say, the social seriousness of the situation should be
established. The child should be made to feel penitent, but charging
him with guilt is not the best way to accomplish this result. Such a
course in the nature of an attack places him on the defensive; it is a
challenge and his mind leaps to the encounter.
"What are you charged with, Jim?" asked the matron in a deten-
tion home of a small boy. "Soda water, see, I am charged with soda
water. I stole a case of it." His flippancy disappeared in court, how-
ever, under the following procedure. "Who earns the living in your
home?" "Mother." "How?" "She scrubs floors, but she is in the
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hospital now." "Who cooks ?" "My little sister." "What do you do
to help?" "Nothing."
The small boy begins to feel uncomfortable and to' shed tears.
Your response depends on where you place your emphasis.
How change of emphasis from a procedure designed to incrimi-
nate and to convict to a procedure socialized and aiming at welfare-
how this change of emphasis leads to change in the attitude of the
child is seen nowhere more clearly than in the treatment of young girl
sex-offenders. Los Angeles is the honey pot of movie-dreaming youth.
One girl of eighteen was recently before the court on a police com-
plaint of soliciting. She lived, in Detroit and had lodged in half a
dozen jails en route. Arraigned in the police court of Los Angeles,
she was transferred to thel Juvenile Court. She was plainly bored
there. Well she knew she could not be convicted of anything more
serious than vagrancy. This quiet room, this woman sitting as judge,
these women who sat as clerk, reporter and bailiff-why, it was all
child's play.
"Why are you here ?" she was asked.
"Well, they can't prove anything on me. No one ever saw me
take a cent, and I had my clothes on."
"You are not accused of anything here, save that you are a per-
son under the age of twenty-one with no parental control, and in
danger of leading an immoral life, and should the court find it neces-
sary for your protection, you can be held until you are twenty-one."
It was a bewildered young person. Gone were the old words to
lean on, "bail," "guilty or not guilty," "fine," "thirty days," etc.; gone
the smiling policeman, the friendly detectives. She was just a girl,
stranded; a prodigal daughter, not a defendant. Yet this court im-
pressed her with the power it had to compel obedience. She told her
story. She submitted to discipline. What prosecution could not do,
co6peration secured in half an hour.
So, too, in matters pertaining to the custody of children. Parents
accustomed to regard the child as private property gre perplexed at a
view which places the welfare of the child first. A girl of eleven had
been neglected at home. Parents, two sets of step-parents, flanked by
the in-laws, flung mutual charges ranging from blasphemy to incest.
"This is not a domestic arena," they were told; "only one issue is here
today-what can you suggest for the welfare of this child?" When
it was made clear to them that the child herself had the paramount
right, that parental selfishness must give way, their attitude changed
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gradually and, instead of demanding a property right, they agreed that
at the present time none of them were fit to have her.
A third principle in socialization is the dynamic principle of modi-
fication of order provided for in the Juvenile Court. In general legal
proceedings the sentence, or judgment, is final. The game is lost or
won; the finality of Doomsday is not mere irrevocable. But the Ju-
venile Court's decisions are like youth itself, capable of being modified,
meeting each tomorrow afresh, adjusting perpetually to life. The
courts have held unfitness temporary. What does that mean? It
means eternal chance for the erring parent; it may mean the oppor-
tunity for reconstructed family or individual life.
Jennie, a girl of twenty-three, formerly a ward of the Juvenile
Court, was married to a soldier and mother of a three-year-old boy.
The husband had sought unsuccessfully in the divorce court and in the
criminal court to deprive her of the custody of the child on the ground
of her unfitness. Nothing could be proved against this mother, and
yet one look at the child, thin, with pale, sad eyes, supported the belief
that he needed care. The matter came into the Juvenile Court. Jen-
nie resisted any attempt to incriminate her, and her success as a client
on the defensive had become proverbial.
"Your child-has he had a chance?" not the question, had she
been guilty of misconduct? but-"Your little boy-is he all right?"
Brushing aside her attorney, she said, "No, no, I have neglected
him."
Then followed her statement of her unfitness with a plea for a
chance to prove fitness. Six months afterwards she had won back her
baby, whom she had given up voluntarily for his welfare. She had
cooperated in a plan of constructive rehabilitation.
A fatal blow to socialization, however, is the attempt to use evi-
dence secured in the Juvenile Court as the basis of other legal action.
Jennie's husband, after her rehabilitation, tried to use her statements
made in the juvenile Court as evidence against her in the divorce court.
He was unsuccessful. Twenty-six states have safeguarding provisions
against using evidence gained in the Juvenile Court against the child
in other proceedings. 7 But this protection should be extended to par-
ents who in good faith, for purposes of child welfare, give evidence
against themselves in the Juvenile Court.
A driving force in socialization is the use of the social opinion of
the group one belongs to, and has most respect for; from a sociological
7A Summary of Juvenile Court Legislation in the United States, Federal
Children's Bureau Publication No. 70, p. 41.
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point of view this is one of the benefits of a jury trial, the submission
of one's self to judgment of one's peers. How this social force can
be obtained in children's cases is a problem. Recently an experiment
was tried in the Juvenile Court of Los Angeles, where the girl officers
of an opportunity, self-government school, known as El Retiro, main-
tained by the county for wards of the court, were asked to sit with the
referee in the cases of two girls who had run away. The proceeding
was entirely informal, but the benefit secured to the runaway girls and
to the morale of the school has been of untold significance. Far-reach-
ing indeed is' the effect of placing responsibility on youth, and in per-
mitting them, in so far as their young shoulders are able, to carry the
burden of the waywardness of their fellows.
Is the concept of socialization antagonistic to legal principles?
Let us first ask, What is law? In a discussion of this matter reviewed
in the Reports of the American Bar Association, 1902, Vol. 25, page
445, the definition of Blackstone and Austin of the law as a command,
or body of commands, proceeding from the supreme power of a state
is commented on thus, "The law is something more than the mere
formal rules which have been declared in constitutions and statutes
and applied in precedents. . . The real social force is made up of
the principles of social organism; the expressed laws are but rules of
operation."
Lord Coke, certainly no sympathizer of looseness, said: "The
principles of natural rights are perfect and immutable, but the condi-
tion of human law is ever changing, and there is nothing in it which
can stand forever. Human laws are born, live and die."
One of Wendell Phillips' epigrams was this: "Ideas strangle
statutes."
From an anthropological view, that is to say, from a human point
of view, the law is a culture-product of the human race. Its majesty
is derived only from the human spirit, and it is subject to change and
growth just as any other organism. This highly complex, apparently
adamantine structure is indeed changing, and if we read aright the
spirit of the times it is changing quite in the spirit of the modern
family; it is following the lead of its youngest offspring, the Juvenile
Court movement.
To sum up: Socialization of Juvenile Court precedure depends
on the clear, firm grasp of the principles of equity. The court is one
of guardianship, not a penal court. Nothing that the child says can
incriminate him in this court because the object of the court is his
welfare. Socialization involves getting at the whole truth; nothing that
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is true and relevant should be excluded. Socialization involves co-
operation, constructive discipline, and the dynamic concept, as ex-
pressed in the principle that an order in this court may be modified as
life conditions are modified.
The chief obstacles to socialization of Juvenile Court procedure
are lingering shreds of penal terminology and criminal law usage.
Obsolete thinking and unclear thinking are obstacles. Socialization
implies that judges and court officials are to be experts, experts with
scientific training and specialists in the art of human relations.
